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The biological resources of the sea have long fascinated man. The
mystery of what lies beneath the surface has stimulated his imagi-
nation and nurtured hope that in this vast area there are resources
capable of feeding a growing and a still hungry population for cen-
turies to come. But, at the same time, realization of this hope is
impeded by the opacity, instability, and sheer magnitude of the
medium itself–by man’s inability to see and hold. Fishing–one
of man’s earliest callings–is still haphazard and subject to the
vagaries of weather, ocean currents, and mysterious migrations
(Christy and Scott, 1965, p. v).
1 Introduction
In a broad sense, the topic of this lecture covers much of empirical research
in fisheries economics. What happens in a fishery upon a change in regula-
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tion? When regulations change in fisheries, the changes depend on an array
of factors, from environmental and biological factors to economics and social
factors. Fishermen’s response to changes in regulations are thus intimately
connected to all relevant factors, and changes in regulations should be in-
terdependent with fishermen’s response. Upon such reflections, the topic is
clearly connected to the fundamental, empirical question What happens in
fisheries upon changes? So, everything is connected, and in order to un-
derstand the empirics of fisheries economics, I need to establish what has
become known, among other things, as the Fisheries Problem. From there, I
will discuss evidence of rent dissipation and inefficiency in fisheries, before I
move on to rights-based management and related evidence. I will also discuss
more recent ideas on self-governance and spatial behavior.
The title of the lecture uses the word ‘behavior’ and its presence requires
some discussion. It makes me think about behavioral economics. Behav-
ioral economics relies heavily on experiments, but has recently broadened its
methodological scope to use most common methods in modern economics
(Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, p. 7). Behavioral economics concerned
with fishermen is quite limited, but some fishermen experiments have been
carried out. The experiments are mostly concerned with risk preferences,
perhaps as a reaction to the seemingly popular idea of risk loving fishermen.
In a limited discussion like this, I cannot address all aspects of the ques-
tion What happens in in fisheries upon changes? The main focus will be
on fishers responses to regulations in change, but in places I have found it
necessary to discuss responses more generally.
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2 The Fisheries Problem
The fundamental problem in fisheries was recognized already in 1911 by the
Danish economist Jens Warming (see Warming, 1911). He wrote in Danish,
however, and his ideas remained unknown for many years; his seminal 1911
paper was first translated into English in the nineteen eighties (Andersen,
1983).
Not until 1954, with Gordon’s ‘The Economic Theory of a Common-
Property Resource: The Fishery’ (Gordon, 1954), did economic analysis of
fisheries really begin (Squires, 2009, p. 638). Gordon established a model of
rent dissipation under open access which made it clear that the fundamental
reason for overfishing and overcapacity in fisheries is the lack of property
rights (Gordon, 1954, pp. 130 - 131). The idea is simple; as long as there is
a positive rent in a fishery with open access, new fishermen will enter until
the rent is dissipated. Put into the economist’s language, excess effort enters
until average rather than marginal product equals opportunity costs (Wilen,
2000, p. 308). The allocation of inputs would be inefficient; each fisherman
has an incentive to catch as much fish as possible as fast possible, before
anybody else catches it.
Gordon also pointed out that the maximum physical yield as a manage-
ment objective promoted by biologists overlooks the fundamental issue in
common properties (1954, p. 136). Economists are still working to convince
biologists and marine scientists of the true nature of the Fisheries Problem;
unwanted incentives from incomplete property rights. (See Wilen (2006) for
a recent attempt.) Notwithstanding, Squires (2009) claims that Gordon’s
insight about incentives
. . . has been the central contribution of fisheries economics to fish-
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eries management, and its concepts and ideas have widely diffused
to other social sciences, fisheries science, conservation biology and
ecology, industry, governments, and international organizations,
and are even starting to make inroads into the thinking of con-
servationists (p. 638).
A perhaps more well-known description of the commons problem is Hardin’s
1968 article ‘The Tragedy of the Commons,’ published in Science. He writes
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his [input] without limit – in a world that
is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in
the freedom of the commons (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244).
It has been suggested that Hardin’s enormous influence and his depiction of
the situation as a tragedy has been unfortunate (Ostrom, 1990, p. 8, Wilen,
2006, p. 543); in a tragedy, helpless individuals are lead to destruction in
an inexorable process. Such a view underpins modern management systems
(Wilen, 2006, p. 543).
3 Rent Dissipation, Inefficiency, and Over-
capitalization
In their path-breaking analysis of the Pacific Halibut fishery, Crutchfield
and Zellner were perhaps among the first to investigate and document rent
dissipation and overcapacity in fisheries in an economic setting (Crutchfield
and Zellner, 1962). They noted, for example, that from 1929 to 1951, the
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size of the fleet increased with 78 percent, while total catch increased only
27 percent from 1932 to 1951 (p. 44); a clear sign of overcapacity. The
overcapacity lead to shorter fishing seasons, which went from more than 200
days in the early 1930’s to close to 20 days in the 1950’s (see table 4, p. 43).
Not only did Crutchfield and Zellner establish a quality standard for ap-
plied work in environmental economics (Zilberman, 2003, p. 177), with their
historical account of the fishery and its regulation, their comprehensive anal-
ysis of the industry and related markets, and their policy recommendations,
they also developed methods and new theory as they went along. A particu-
larly interesting instance is the first appendix which was the first to solve the
dynamic fisheries problem, that is, not only solving for the optimal steady
state, but how to get there, (which depends on the discount rate, biologi-
cal growth, and dynamic costs) using calculus of variations (Crutchfield and
Zellner, 1962, pp. 112–117; for a discussion, see Wilen, 2000, p. 311, footnote
8).
Another early empirical analysis in fisheries economics was that of the
Norwegian winter herring fishery by Pontecorvo and Vartdal (1967). (Pon-
tecorvo visited the Norwegian School of Economics at the time.) They found
‘disturbing results.’ Assuming no productivity gains in the period 1950 -
1966, they found that 1/6 of the fleet was redundant (p. 81). The technical
innovations had been many, however; echo sounder, sonar, nylon nets, power
block, and larger and faster boats all probably increased the fishing power
of the fleet (footnote 3, pp. 73–74). By assuming a 50 percent increase in
productivity, more than 40 percent of capital and labor inputs in the fishery
were found to be in excess. Pontecorvo and Vartdal were stricken by ‘the
gross nature of the misallocation’ revealed (p. 81). It is important to keep
in mind, however, that the fleet which operated on the winter herring also
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participated in other fisheries, and that the apparent excess capacity may
have been less ‘gross’ in a larger picture. In that regard, while suggesting to
limit entry to the fishery, Pontecorvo and Vartdal noted that it would, in the
short run, only shift capacity elsewhere and that a more general evaluation
were needed (p. 85). That is an interesting comment which resonates recent
concerns about the shifting of capacity from the Northern to the Southern
Hemisphere (see Alder and Sumaila, 2004, Figure 3, p. 166; figure shows
‘total access years’ agreements).
In 1969, Crutchfield and Pontecorvo published an analysis of the Pacific
Salmon Fisheries (see Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969). It had the subtitle
‘A Study of Irrational Conservation,’ which clearly signalled both Crutchfield
& Pontecorvo’s opinion of the current and historical regulation of the Pacific
salmon fisheries and the nature of their findings. The salmon fisheries in
North-West America is an extremely complicated situation to analyze, even
by today’s standards. The Alaskan fisheries, for example, are dispersed across
2000 miles of rugged coastline, from the Alexander archipelago in the east to
the Bering Sea in the west. Five different species are present, sometimes all
in the same river, and, at the time (late 1960’s, that is), salmon was found
in approximately 2000 streams across Alaska (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo,
1969, p. 60). Further, some salmon runs last for only a couple of weeks per
year, but possibly at different times in different rivers, and different species
spawn at different times of the year. In contrast, around the turn of the
century (1900, that is), one man and one assistant were responsible for the
enforcement of fishery regulation in all of Alaska (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo,
1969, p.95).
In their analysis, Crutchfield and Pontecorvo found clear evidence of over-
fishing and overcapitalization in the Alaskan fisheries (see Figure 1). For
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Alaska Salmon fishery (number of fishermen, total catch, and
catch per fisherman, 1927-66), see Crutchfield and Pontecorvo (1969, Figure
9, p. 58). (b) Alaska Salmon fishery (fathoms of purse seine and gill net,
and total catch, 1927-65), see Crutchfield and Pontecorvo (1969, Figure 10,
p. 59).
example, in 1969, at the time they wrote the book, twice as many fishermen,
using more equipment, fished only 40% as many salmons as were caught in
the mid-1930’s (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969, p. 60). As the fishery was
believed to be in an bionomic (rent dissipated) equilibrium in the mid-1930’s,
a rise in the real price of salmon explained the increase in effort (figure 8, p.
57). They also calculated (guesstimated) the dissipated rents and efficiency
of the fishery and concluded that, if efficiency of gear had improved with 50%
over 20 years, the relative amount of unnecessary gear was 83% in the latter
half of the 1950’s (table 5, p. 115).
Crutchfield and Pontecorvo also analyzed the salmon fisheries in the
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Puget Sound (between Seattle and Vancouver). There, too, did they find
evidence of excessive capacity (figure 12, p. 127). The fishery was from
1946 regulated by an international commission (U.S./Canada). The main,
regulative measure was seasonal openings (and a host of gear specifications),
and the target was a biological escapement level. (An escapement level is
simply the share of stock unfished.) In addition, the distribution of catch
between Canadian and U.S. fishers should ideally be 50/50, a clause which
severely complicated the regulations. Further, one needed a license to fish,
but these were seemingly unlimited. While issued licenses were increasing,
average catches of pink salmon declined (figure 18, p. 156). Crutchfield and
Pontecorvo concluded:
As long as the present situation continues, there can be no real
hope of economic health in the fishery. Any increase in relative
prices of salmon is promptly swallowed up by increased entry,
rising costs, and more stringent pressure on the physical resource
and those charged with its management. It simply leads to a new
equilibrium, no more satisfactory than the previous one, with a
net loss to the economy as a whole as more factors of production
are trapped in the fishery (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969, p.
196).
Just as Crutchfield and Pontecorvo’s analysis appeared in print, Canada
introduced a new regulation scheme, a fleet control program, in their salmon
fisheries to cope with the overcapacity problems (see Pearse and Wilen, 1979,
p. 765). The regulation scheme went through several steps in order to control
capacity (Wilen, 1988, pp. 314–315):
• Limited numbers of vessels (1969).
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• Limited total tonnage of fleet, with ton-for-ton replacement rule (1970).
• Limited length of smaller vessels with no registered tonnage.
• Limited gear types (1977).
• Limited combining licenses, prohibiting more than one license per boat.
Despite the spiraling regulations, effort continued to increase. As pointed
out by Pearse and Wilen (1979), such regulations did not address the fun-
damental problem which needed be addressed; excessive use of inputs (p.
765).
The phenomenon observed by Pearse and Wilen in the Canadian salmon
fisheries was already predicted by economic theory (Scott, 1962; see Pearse
and Wilen, 1979, footnote 10, p. 765) and has later become known as capital
stuffing; if some dimension of effort is restricted, fishermen will expand effort
along some other dimension whenever they find it worthwhile. (And they
usually do when property rights are incomplete.) The related, theoretical
short-comings were pinpointed by Wilen (1979). Capital stuffing as observed
by Pearse and Wilen (1979) is a case of regulatory induced innovation and
regulatory induced changes in investment (Wilen, 1988, p. 319). Townsend
(1985) claimed that some capital stuffing may indeed be economically desir-
able, but empirical investigation, on a case-by-case basis, would be necessary
in order to evaluate the total, net effect. Squires (1994) formalizes input
quantity control in the context of rationing theory.
Pearse and Wilen (1979) set out to analyze and evaluate the impact of
the fleet control program. Their measure of success was ‘whether the scheme
[had] driven a wedge between costs and revenues and allowed some of the
potential economic rents to be realized’ (pp. 765–766). They found that labor
input in the fishery had declined with 16 percent in the period 1968 - 1975 (p.
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767), and that revenues had increased with 4.4 percent per annum from 1957
to 1977. Further, capital input increased annually with 5.7 percent and 3.7
percent prior to and after 1969 (p. 768). Pearse and Wilen concluded that
the fleet control program, or ‘rationalization scheme’ as it also was called,
had been partially successful in checking the expansion of capital engaged in
the fishery’ (p. 768). Capital input had, however, continued to increase from
already redundant levels in 1969, as reported by Crutchfield and Pontecorvo
(1969).
Moving to more recent evidence, Hilborn et al. (2003) reports that many
fisheries are in good shape biologically, but the majority of fisheries are still
overfished (see figure 6, p. 371). In another study, Worm et al. (2009) finds
that 63 percent of worldwide fish stocks require rebuilding (p. 578). Taking
a more depressing and controversial stand, Worm et al. (2006) project that
all of the world’s fisheries can be collapsed by the year 2048.
4 Rights-Based Management
As Gordon’s (1954) legacy started to ‘make inroads into the thinking’ of oth-
ers than economists and after the extension of national jurisdictions in 1976,
putting many fish stocks in exclusive, national waters, the stage was set for
a new approach to fisheries management. The new approach, known as Indi-
vidual Tradable Quotas (ITQs), simply transferred use-rights to the fish stock
to individual fishermen. ITQs are usually put on top of a quantity control
such that they represent the right to a share of a total quota (Squires, 2009,
p. 645). Christy (1973) presented the first theoretical consideration of indi-
vidual quotas. Since then, ITQs have come into use worldwide. Prominent
examples are the New Zealand and Icelandic fisheries (see Hannesson, 2004,
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for an extensive discussion). Subsequent, formal analysis of ITQs in combi-
nation with quantity controls have established that efficiency can improve as
fishermen no longer have to compete for shares of the total quantity (Boyce,
1992). In contrast, ITQs cannot eliminate over-capitalization stemming from
externalities caused by stock-level-dependent (density) harvesting costs and
congestion externalitites; other issues are bycatch and highgrading (Boyce,
1992, see also Casey et al., 1995 and in particular Squires et al., 1995). Go-
ing into more details, Hannesson (2000) shows how the labor remuneration
system may lead to overinvestment under ITQs.
The main, attractive feature of ITQs are that they align incentives be-
tween fishermen and regulators, and among fishermen themselves, to main-
tain a sustainable fishery. Further, ITQs stimulate development and innova-
tion in end-products, self-enforcement, and input and effort are consolidated.
They also lead to capitalization possibilities of future profits and wealth cre-
ation (Wilen, 2006, pp. 537–538).
The halibut fishery off British Columbia adopted individual quotas in
1991; there were initial constraints on trade and exchange which were sub-
sequently loosened. The BC halibut experience is particularly interesting in
several aspects; it had been exploited for a long time and could with reason-
able confidence be assumed to be in a rent dissipated, inefficient equilibrium
by 1991, it had been extensively studied under earlier regimes (Crutchfield
and Zellner, 1962), and the BC fleet operated side by side the Alaskan fishery
which remained open access.
The BC experience was broadly evaluated by Casey et al. (1995) through
analysis of the fleet, the processing industry, markets, and several surveys.
Among the most notable changes was the change in landing patterns. Part
of the new quota program was the extension of the season to approximately
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eight months; prior to the new program the season openings were down to
six frantic days (see Grafton et al., 2000, Table 1, p. 685). (The situa-
tion in the Alaskan halibut fishery was even more extreme, where season
length was reduced to two or three 24-hour openings; individual quotas were
adopted in the Alaskan fishery in 1995 [Knapp, 1996, p. 44].) Figures 2 and 3
(Casey et al., 1995, pp. 217–218) demonstrates the new landing pattern and
compares it to the Alaskan open access fishery. Landings were distributed
throughout the season with low volumes upon the Alaskan open seasons. An-
other notable change was the quality of the end product; prior to 1991, most
halibut ended up as frozen products, after, most was sold as more valuable
fresh fish (Casey et al., 1995, p. 219). In other words, the individual quotas
in the BC halibut fishery created wealth through incentives to consolidate
effort and through higher quality and more valuable end-products.
In a subsequent analysis of economic efficiency in the BC halibut fishery,
exploiting the natural experiment provided by the individual quota program,
Grafton et al. (2000, p. 705) found that efficiency fell from 1988 to 1991.
The poor performance was explained by low catches and bad weather. From
1991 to 1994, efficiency increased, although the evidence was weak for large
vessels (see Grafton et al., 2000, footnote 61, p. 706); there were gains from
changes in product form as found by Casey et al. (1995). A possible ob-
jection to the analysis of Grafton et al. (2000) would be that the program
was not exogenous, but rather endogenous in a manner discussed by Homans
and Wilen (1997) (‘[. . . ] regulations are fundamentally endogenous and dy-
namic’ [p. 2]). Notwithstanding, one would be hard pressed to argue for
any expectation of improvement in a fishery with such a long history of rent
dissipation.
As theory predicts and experience shows, open access leads to overfishing.
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In certain instances, extreme degrees of overfishing leads to collapse in the
fish stock. The Pacific halibut fishery, already discussed at great length,
crashed spectacularly in the 1920’s. And infamously, the Northern Cod stock
collapsed in the early 1990’s and has still not returned. Recent evidence
suggest that ITQ management may reverse the collapse of fisheries (Costello
et al., 208), which further suggest that fishermen behave more in line with
conservation or stewardship ideals under ITQs. (It has been contested that
many fisheries has gone directly from open access to ITQ schemes, and that
it is simply the inherent total catch restriction which leads to decreased
overfishing [R. Hannesson, personal communication]).
The last piece of evidence on behavior of fishermen under rights-based
management discussed here is very recent (yet unpublished, reference by
courtesy of the authors). In an innovate analysis, Grainger and Costello
(2009, unpublished) investigates the relationship between the security of an
ITQ and its market price. The idea is to exploit differences in ITQ schemes
in different countries; in New Zealand, the property right vested in an ITQ is
held in perpetuity while in the U.S., for example, ITQs can be revoked by the
government at any time (Grainger and Costello, 2009, pp. 3-4, unpublished).
They construct the ITQ lease to sales price ratio, called the dividend price
ratio, as economic theory suggests that the security of an ITQ is reflected in
its sales price but not in its lease price. Their evidence lines up with theory;
lease to sales price ratios are smaller in New Zealand (Grainger and Costello,
2009, Figure 1, p. 7). The same effect is seen within New Zealand, where
ITQs in less secure fisheries on migratory species have higher lease to sales
price ratios (Grainger and Costello, 2009, Figure 2, p. 8). A further possible
extension would be to see whether the quality of the total catch decision is
reflected in the ITQ price.
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Another form of rights-based management are territorial use rights in
fisheries (TURFs), suggested by Christy (1982). A TURF involves the ex-
clusive right to fish in a given area or territory. TURFs are perhaps less
common in use than ITQs, but may become just as important as the focus
of economists and marine scientists moves towards spatial behavior of both
fish stocks and fishermen.
5 Spatial Behavior
Spatial behavior was in fact an important part of the very earliest insights
into modern fisheries economics; both Warming (1911) and Gordon (1954)
built their arguments upon a model of two fishing grounds and showed how
net profit rates would equalize between the grounds. Despite the early notion
of space and distance, empirical analysis of spatial behavior did not surface
until the 1980’s, and explicit, spatial models of fisheries did not appear until
the 1990’s.
Location choice among fishermen has been widely studied since the 1980’s.
In an early contribution, Eales and Wilen (1986) found that location choices
among shrimp fishermen in northern California were economically motivated;
fishermen maximized expected profits and behaved according to theory. Fur-
ther, the studied fishermen were responsive rather than sluggish in their be-
havior, contrary to other evidence (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983).
The mid-Atlantic clam fishery off the eastern U.S. coast use dredges to
harvest surf clams. Prior to 1990, the fishery was regulated through the
number of vessels and dredge time. In 1990, the regulations were replaced
with an ITQ program (Marcoul and Weninger, 2008, p. 1935). Analyzing
search and adaptive learning, Marcoul and Weninger (2008) find that fishers
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searched more for high abundance sites in response to tighter control on
dredge time (p. 1939). Interestingly, restrictions on dredge time lead to
higher catch per unit effort; whether it was an increase in abundance or
caused by more searching and increased knowledge about the stock is unclear
(p. 1943). Further, fishermen displayed behavior ‘consistent with a model of
rational search and learning’ (p. 1942).
The conclusions from an analysis of location choice among New England
Trawlers, seems partly at odds with the evidence cited above:
To assume that effort will flow between areas or fisheries to equal-
ize catch or revenue rates is unlikely to provide reliable predictions
even when steam time differentials are accounted for. [. . . ] What
is very clear is that in a fishery with complex seasonal patterns of
fish movement, catchability and value, individuals’ historical fish-
ing patterns are major determinants of how effort is distributed
in the future (Holland and Sutinen, 2000, p. 148).
Holland and Sutinen (2000) do find a weak influence from differences in
revenues on location choice, but the individual fisher’s choice history has a
stronger influence (p. 148). The approach taken by Holland and Sutinen
(2000) may be ‘useful in predicting the redistribution of fishing effort as
conditions and regulations in the fishery change’ (p. 149).
Upon more space and time, the discussion would extend to the relation-
ship between spatial behavior and risk preferences. Interesting research is
done by Mistiaen and Strand (2000), who develop a model of location choice
which allows for heterogeneous risk preferences, by Smith and Wilen (2005),
who look at risk preferences among Californian sea urchin divers and finds
heterogeneous risk preferences and that preferences towards different types
of risk (physical and financial) are correlated, and by Eggert and Tveter˚as
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(2004), who study heterogeneous risk preferences and gear choices among
Swedish demersal trawl fishermen.
A prominent assumption among biologists and marine scientists modeling
spatial behavior of fishermen in response to spatial management measures is
that displaced fishers simply redistribute over the remaining fishable areas
in the same pattern as fishers were distributed prior to the spatial measures.
Such assumptions can lead astray (Smith and Wilen, 2003, pp. 184, 200).
The analysis provided by Smith and Wilen (2003) has a new flavor to
it. It evolves in two steps. First, they estimate a model of fishermen (sea
urchin divers) behavior depending on a host of variables, among them wave
period and hight, wind speed, distance, and expected revenues. Then, they
simulate a highly sophisticated metapopulation model which integrates bio-
logical, spatial features such as ocean currents and biomass migration with a
calibrated model of fishermen behavior. In certain instances, the inclusion of
spatial fisher behavior leads to opposite conclusions about the benefits from
spatial closures (Smith and Wilen, 2003, p. 200). Ultimately, they raise
questions ‘about whether oceanographic dispersal is the key driver of spatial
closure impacts, or whether harvester dispersal may be equally important’
(Smith and Wilen, 2003, p. 204).
In a subsequent analysis, Smith and Wilen (2004) added another layer by
allowing for endogenous port choice. They found little response in port choice
to changes in expected revenues in the short term, but found large effects
in the long term (p. 102). Again, they concluded that na¨ıve assumptions
regarding spatial behavior may lead to conclusions ‘substantially at variance’
with more reasonable assumptions (p. 109).
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6 Self-Governance
2009 Noble Prize winner Elinor Ostrom suggest that rights-based manage-
ment, or privatization, is not necessarily the only way to solve the commons
problem (Ostrom, 1990, p. 14).
Institutions are rarely either private or public [. . . ] Many suc-
cessful [common pool resource] institutions are rich mixtures of
“private-like” and “public-like” institutions defying classification
in a sterile dichotomy. By “successful” I mean institutions that
enable individuals to achieve productive outcomes in situations
where temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present (Os-
trom, 1990, pp. 14–15).
A prominent example of a successful solution devised by participants in
a small, inshore fishery in Alanya, Turkey. After years of trial-and-error
efforts, they came up with an genuine set of rules to manage the fishery. The
system spaces fishers far enough apart on the grounds such that production
capabilities are ‘optimized.’ All boats have equal chances to fish at the best
spots, resources are not wasted on searching for or fighting over spots, and
there are no signs of overcapitalization (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 18–21).
Ostrom (1990) discusses a long list of both successful and unsuccess-
ful self-organized institutional solutions to common resource problems. In
a study of 30 coastal fisheries which were self-organized to some extent,
Schlager (1994, p. 264) finds that fishermen self-organize to assign fish-
ing spots (assignment problems) and reduce gear interference (technological
externalities). However, in no fisheries were institutions addressing the com-
mons problem developed. ‘Since fishers cannot measure with sufficient accu-
racy the magnitude of the problem, nor the exact causes, they are unlikely
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to devise arrangements that would directly address [the commons problem],
such as individual transferable quotas’ (Schlager, 1994, p. 252). Schlager
claims, however, that central governing bodies hardly would be able to con-
figure as effective rules as the fishermen themselves (p.265) (see also Ostrom,
1990, Ostrom et al., 1994).
7 Experimental Research
Although not experimental, Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) introduced un-
certainty and risk preferences in fisheries economics. Since fishing seemingly
is a risky profession, fishermen are perceived to be risk lovers (Smith and
Wilen, 2005, p. 54). There is little evidence to support such a conjecture
(Eggert and Martinsson, 2004, p. 550).
The rational for using experiments to reveal preferences and agent charac-
teristics is that the set of potential explanations for different outcomes ideally
is small. (See Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004 for a discussion of experimen-
tal versus behavioral economics.) Perhaps the first to expose fishermen to
experiments was Erling Moxnes. In an article ‘Not Only the Tragedy of
the Commons: Misperceptions of Bioeconomics,’ he studied the ability of
fishermen as well as scientists and bureaucrats from the fisheries sector and
‘others’ innocent of fisheries management to manage a renewable resource
when the commons problem was absent (see Moxnes, 1998). Approximately
three fourths of the subjects overinvested in exploitation (p. 1239). More
seriously, perhaps, scientists and bureaucrats did not perform better than the
other groups involved (p. 1241). (See Walker et al. (1990) for an experiment
placing subjects in a limited-access common-pool resource setting; subjects
were not fishermen, however.)
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The experiment by Moxnes was not ideal to reveal subject’s preferences;
whether overinvestments were intentional betting (risk loving behavior) or
‘misperceptions of bioeconomics’ cannot be identified. Eggert and Martins-
son (2004) were first to investigate risk preferences among fishermen with a
stated preference approach (p. 551). In their sample of Swedish commer-
cial fishermen, approximately half were risk neutral, a quarter risk averse,
and a quarter strongly risk averse. Surveying their subjects, they found
that strongly risk averse subjects earned 22% less than risk-neutral fisher-
men which strengthen their findings. Further, risk preferences were explained
by the proportion of household income from fishing, type of gear, political
preferences, and attitudes towards introducing individual quotas (p. 559).
Turning to fisheries in developing economies, Eggert and Lokina (2007)
find that artisanal fishermen on Lake Victoria have somewhat similar pref-
erences: In the sample, subjects distributed approximately evenly into char-
acterizations as risk averse, risk neutral, and risk seekers (p. 49). The risk
preferences were related to a set of other characteristics regarding boat size,
assets, and others (p. 61).
8 Final Remarks
It is well established that Gordon’s (1954) predictions and predictions from
economic theory in general are correct; incomplete property rights create
incentives which matter for common property outcomes. There is mounting
evidence that addressing property rights, as with individual quotas, goes
a long way to improve economic efficiency in fisheries. Fixing incomplete
property rights reduces overcapitalization and create values.
Recent developments demonstrate the important role played by spatial
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behavior. Economists and biologists need to understand how spatial behavior
relates to regulations and management.
Behavioral responses to regulations regarding bycatch has not been men-
tioned in the discussion. Regulating bycatch, however, becomes important
in multispecies fisheries and when fisheries interfere with endangered species.
Legislation regarding endangered species is strong in the U.S. and is likely
to become stronger in the entire Western world. It will be of critical im-
portance to understand behavior of economic agents related to endangered
species type regulations and legislation.
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